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1. Introduction 
1.1. Description of ADRN 
The Administrative Data Research Network (ADRN) is a 
UK-wide partnership between academia, government 
departments and agencies, national statistical authorities, 
funders and the wider research community to facilitate new 
economic and social research based on routinely collected 
government administrative data.
The ADRN is establishing a new legal, secure and efficient 
pathway for the research community to access de-identified 
linked administrative datasets. 
This will potentially benefit our society by providing a  
greater evidence base to inform policy.
The ADRN consists of:
	 u	four Administrative Data Research 
 		Centres (ADRCs):
	 	 ADRC England: led by the University of 
 		 		Southampton
	 	 ADRC Northern Ireland: led by Queen’s 
 					University Belfast
	 	 ADRC Scotland: led by the University of 
 					Edinburgh
	 	 ADRC Wales: led by Swansea University
	 u	an overarching Administrative Data Service, 
 		which is the co-ordinating body of the Network
	 u	administrative data owners
	 u	the Economic and Social Research Council 
					(the funding body)
	 u	the UK Statistics Authority  
 		(chairing the ADRN Board)
The ADRN has commissioned this guide on statistical 
disclosure control to support the development of 
knowledge and skills in the subject area. 
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1.2. Protecting confidentiality in 
  research outputs
The ADRN has a proven safe mechanism to manage research use and outputs of 
confidential data. However, because the data that the researchers use are sensitive, it is 
possible that the publication of statistical analyses could inadvertently lead to the disclosure 
of sensitive information. 
Many years of experience in managing research outputs, with very few problems, shows 
that there is a negligible risk of such a disclosure – but that risk does exist. Outputs are 
checked by researchers and trained output checkers before they are published. This is 
called ‘output statistical disclosure control’, or OSDC. As a result of this, statistical disclosure 
risk is reduced.
The ADRN generally uses the accepted best practice for controlled research environments 
in the form of ‘principles-based OSDC’ or PBOSDC (except ADRC Northern Ireland; see 
section 2.3.4). This was designed specifically for assessing the disclosure risk that may 
be associated with research outputs to allow for the complex methods that researchers 
employ. As OSDC generally goes hand in hand with good analytical practice (for example, 
having many observations tends to both lower disclosure risk and produce results of greater 
statistical value), this is a check rather than a restriction on publication. A key element 
of PBOSDC is that researchers are trained to be fully involved in identifying problematic 
outputs themselves, rather than relying only on the people who check outputs. This allows 
the researchers to think in advance about the disclosure risks that their analyses might 
present.
This guide is intended for
 u researchers who need to learn what OSDC is and how that relates to their work
 u data owners who are concerned about inadvertent disclosure of results
 u the wider public who are interested in how the ADRN’s security model  
(the ‘Five Safes’) works to encourage research while protecting confidentiality
This is not a comprehensive guide to OSDC: researchers who use the ADRN and therefore 
have access to the source data will go through an extensive training programme. The aim of 
this guide is to provide an overview.
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2. Statistical disclosure control 
 of outputs 
2.1. SDC and output-based SDC
2.1.1. What is SDC?
The Network exists to allow researchers to access linked de-identified administrative 
data which are combined for specific projects for a defined period of time. Many of these 
contain detailed information which for ethical or legal reasons cannot be released into the 
public domain. Statistical analyses on the data do not generally, of themselves, produce 
any disclosure risk, but disclosive outputs may inadvertently be produced. Such outputs, 
if detailed enough, might allow someone reading the research to discover confidential 
information about an individual, household or business. This risk is often difficult to 
measure and depends on a range of factors. The question becomes one of managing this 
risk: how can it be minimised while also maintaining the usefulness of the output?
Statistical disclosure control (SDC) is the approach used in managing the risk. SDC uses 
statistical techniques to prevent individuals, households or enterprises being identified in 
published information. SDC aims to make sure data are not disclosive and, importantly, 
would not be perceived as being disclosive. 
The ultimate aim of SDC is to maximise the usefulness of the outputs while minimising the 
risk of disclosure (or the perception of disclosure). This level of risk is never zero, so the 
aim is to reduce, to an acceptably low level, the possibility that confidential information is 
released. The definition of an acceptably low level depends on factors such as the age and 
sensitivity of the output.
2.1.2. What is output-based SDC?
SDC can be applied at different points in the process of producing outputs. ‘Input SDC’ 
is the technique of protecting microdata (the individual records held in the data) before 
researchers start their work. These data can be protected by methods such as removing 
direct identifiers and making sure combinations of specific variables do not identify (unique) 
records in the data.
Network datasets do have some input SDC applied: researchers never get to see direct 
identifiers such as name and address. But making these data fully non-disclosive destroys 
their research value; this defeats the purpose of the project. Instead, Network researchers 
go through extensive certification processes and use secure and tightly governed facilities. 
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The Network then allows unrestricted research on confidential data and checks the 
statistical results that researchers want to publish. This is called ‘output-based SDC’, 
or OSDC.
OSDC is concerned with statistical output such as tables for release into the public domain 
either directly or via research papers. Outputs are created from confidential data, so a check 
on the outputs is required. The Network can use a variety of techniques to make sure the 
outputs maintain confidentiality. 
In the following examples, we use simple tables to show how disclosive outputs may 
inadvertently occur in both frequency and magnitude tables.
Example 1 – a frequency table 
Frequency tables are straightforward tables of counts (numbers of observations). 
Male
Good health Fair health Bad health Very bad health Total
White 6 7 3 2 18
Mixed 2 2 3 1 8
Asian 1 0 5 0 6
Black 0 5 0 0 5
Other 0 0 0 1 1
Total 9 14 11 4 38
Table 1: Potential disclosure problems – frequency tables
In a frequency table, there are a number of potential disclosure scenarios, all of which are 
related to either low counts or unusual distribution of counts.  
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In the above example:
 u Identification disclosure is the act of identifying a specific person or unit in the data. 
Counts of ‘1’ in the table allow individuals in the dataset to be identified1.  Individual 
Attribute disclosure is the inference of information about a unit that is in the table 
given partial information you already have about that unit. An example of attribute 
disclosure is shown in the row shaded green. Knowing there is somebody in the 
‘Other’ category in the data discloses this person’s health.
 u Group (attribute) disclosure occurs when all respondents who have some feature 
also have some other feature. Group disclosure is shown in the row shaded blue. All 
people in the ‘black’ category have fair health.
 u Within group (attribute) disclosure occurs when there is one respondent in a single 
category with all other respondents in a different category. Within group disclosure 
is shown in the row shaded yellow. The Asian individual in ‘Good Health’ would know 
that all others in his group have ‘Bad Health’.
Distributions of counts such as that shown in Table 1 do not necessarily prove that the 
table is risky. Both the data provider and data user may have additional information to help 
determine if SDC ought to be applied.
Example 2 – a magnitude table
In magnitude tables, each cell value represents the sum (or average) of a value across all 
respondents belonging to that cell.
Disclosure typically occurs when cells with dominating contributors (for example one large 
supermarket and a number of corner shops) or cells with a small number of contributors 
(for example, oil companies) are present. The most likely source of risk is one member 
of the cell attempting to discover a value relating to a competitor in the same cell. 
(Frequencies are in brackets in the table shown.)
 Local Authority
Manufacturing turnover in £1000s  frequency)
LA1 LA2 LA3 Total
Food products 58 (8) 13 (2) 74 (7) 145 (17)
Textiles 715 (15) 164 (12) 648 (260) 1527 (287)
Paper and paper 
products
98 (4) 158 (22) 47 (12) 303 (38)
Petrochemicals 18 (7) 50 (9) 64 (1) 132 (17)
Total 889 (34) 385 (45) 833 (280) 2107 (359)
Table 2: Potential Disclosure problems – magnitude tables
1 A broad definition of identification disclosure includes self-identification. However with the possible exception 
 of the most sensitive of outputs (e.g. abortion statistics) this is not usually considered to be a major disclosure 
 control issue.
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Cells with frequencies of 1 or 2 are disclosive as turnover values for each company in the 
cell can be worked out exactly. This can be seen in the cells shaded blue.
Cells with dominating contributors can found by looking at the values which make up the 
cell. Suppose the cell shaded green, with four contributors giving a total of £98,000, was 
made up of these values:
Company 1: 48 
Company 2: 45
Company 3: 3 
Company 4: 2
Company 2 could subtract their contribution from the published total and obtain an 
estimate of the turnover of Company 1 to within 10% of the true value. This is potentially 
disclosive and would require further investigation.
2.1.3. Actual versus potential disclosure
Table 1 gives a number of examples of potential disclosure for frequency tables. However, 
this should not be confused with actual disclosure. Statistical disclosure is scenario-based. 
This can be summarised by collating the information known about an individual or other 
unit in an output and seeing what other information can be discovered.
Table 3 (below) considers the row relating to the black males in Table 1. Suppose that the 
local paper receives a letter about the survey from John Smith identifying himself as one of 
the black male respondents; the paper publishes Mr Smith’s name and address. If Mr Smith 
is in the table, then we now know his health status; but although he self-identifies as being 
in the survey, can you reasonably infer with confidence that he is in the table? He might or 
might not be one of the five black males listed in Table 1, depending on how many black 
males were sampled altogether, and why the sub-sample in Table 1 was included. 
We can consider whether Table 1 is disclosive under several response knowledge scenarios.
Scenario Number of black 
male participants 
in the survey
Who is in Table 1 Disclosive?
1 5 All of the survey sample is present Probably
2 15
All the survey participants, 
who are in age band 20-29
Probably
3 15




All survey participants, 
who have recently visited hospital
Possibly
Table 3: Likelihood of actual disclosure – frequency tables
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These scenarios look at different levels of response knowledge and ask whether this 
knowledge would allow someone to find the respondent in the data with a high level 
of confidence.
Scenario 1: Mr Smith is definitely one of the five included in the table, and so this is 
disclosive. You now know his health condition.
Scenario 2: The initial sample is larger, with Table 1 being a subsample with a known age 
range. Someone who knows Mr Smith might reasonably be expected to know his age to 
the nearest decade. If you know Mr Smith is in the survey and you know his age range, it is 
highly likely you now know his health condition.
Scenario 3: The sample is the same size as Scenario 2. The selection criterion is ‘is the 
income information of good enough quality for analysis?’ There is doubt as to whether this 
is disclosive. Even if Mr Smith thinks he supplied income information, this does not mean 
that the researcher agreed it was accurate. On the other hand, colleagues of Mr Smith 
might know he is good with figures and therefore likely to have provided good information.
Scenario 4: This requires more thought. Is it reasonable that you know that somebody 
has been in hospital ‘recently’? Mr Smith’s line manager might be aware of an absence 
from work, or a neighbour might have seen an ambulance at his house, or Mr Smith might 
have had an outpatient appointment that he could fit around work. These hard to define 
possibilities show the difficulty in determining whether identification is likely.
Table 3 only describes whether Table 1 is ‘probably’ or ‘possibly’ disclosive. There is always 
an element of doubt when attempting to identify an individual or household in a published 
table, so exact statements are usually avoided. For example, Mr Smith may be in error in 
stating they have been surveyed, or their details may have been transcribed incorrectly.
Suppose that health, rather than being a question in the survey, is actually a value derived 
from other variables in the survey. In this case, the specific data is not disclosive even 
if the cells numbers are small, unless detailed information on how the variable is derived 
is published. 
If the variable derivation is straightforward (such as, an income of over £100k defines a 
predicted health ranking of ‘fair’) the data are disclosive, as you now know something 
more about Mr Smith. In the case of “usable income information supplied”, it might be that 
the researcher supplies details about how the selection was done elsewhere, and so the 
‘probably not’ becomes ‘probably’ when combined with this additional information.
Of course, Mr Smith might not write to the paper, but he might discuss his participation 
with friends or colleagues. The aim of these scenario analyses is to think about what anyone 
looking at your publication would reasonably be able to infer.
ADRN Publication | www.adrn.ac.uk 08
In short, it is almost impossible to prove that something is not disclosive. Proving that 
something is disclosive can be done in specific cases, but low numbers of observations are 
clearly not sufficient by themselves. Whether something is disclosive or not is a balance of 
probabilities. The aim is to achieve ‘acceptably low risk’ – a satisfactory balance between 
confidentiality and usefulness.
In frequency tables, cells with 1 or 2 contributors are usually assumed to be disclosive for 
the majority of outputs, as identification and/or attribute disclosure is highly likely. Rows 
and columns where observations are concentrated in a small number of categories are also 
problematic. 
In magnitude tables, we need to consider how well someone could estimate a true value 
when one or two responses dominate the total. The following are possible guidelines.
 u 5% – for not very sensitive data where an estimate relatively close to the true value is 
acceptable.
 u 15% – for moderately sensitive data.
 u 25% – for very sensitive data, a wide range of protection is required, such as 
business-sensitive data which must be treated especially carefully.
The choice of these values is subjective, and data providers may want special rules for 
particular cases or datasets. Hence, there is often a need for consultation between the 
researcher and the output checker. 
2.2. Principles-based OSDC
2.2.1. The concept of PBOSDC
When considering how to develop guidelines for output, we need to balance the risks to 
individuals of being identified in a publication, and the risk to the public good of not being 
able to use statistical evidence; what we might call the ‘confidentiality’ and ‘usefulness’ 
problems.
For example, in a frequency table such as Table 1, we could consider setting a minimum 
number of observations in any cell, called a ‘threshold’, to avoid problems. Deciding what 
the threshold should be is difficult, as the confidentiality and usefulness problems have 
opposing requirements:
 u confidentiality: a low threshold increases the probability of disclosive cells being 
published, whereas a high threshold reduces this risk considerably
 u usefulness: a low threshold allows most statistical findings to be published; a high 
threshold is likely to mean that some findings are not published 
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PBOSDC recognises that this only becomes a problem if you have to obey specific 
rules without exception. If the threshold rule is treated as a guideline and not a rule, the 
confidentiality/usefulness relationship can be explored by thinking about the output in 
context when factors such as variable sensitivity and age of the data are considered.
For example, if the threshold is set at 0, we have essentially decided that the default 
assumption is that everything can be published. However, the person checking outputs may 
decide that in some cases the confidentiality risk is unacceptably high and ask for these to 
be treated as special cases and not released. Alternatively, the threshold might be set at five, 
which would imply a more cautious approach and more weight placed on confidentiality. 
The researcher might ask for tables with less than five observations in a table cell to be 
released for publication, but would need to show that this does not create an unacceptably 
high confidentiality risk.
This is why this is called ‘principles-based’: principles-based output checking allows 
flexible interpretation of the broad standards and considers each analysis in context, 
consistent with a set of agreed principles. The alternative approach is ‘rules based’ 
which is more suited to publications where the context is well known and consistency 
over time periods is important.
Why is PBOSDC best practice for research environments? Put simply, research outputs 
generally do not have a high confidentiality risk. For example, researchers typically use 
frequency tables to describe the general characteristics of the dataset; low cell counts 
are less likely to occur, or to be essential to the analysis. Hence, the way PBOSDC is 
implemented in practice is to focus on the confidentiality issue with relatively high 
threshold limits. Statistical agencies (and textbooks) often use three as the threshold limit; 
but most controlled environments in the UK using PBOSDC set ten units as the minimum, 
and in some cases this can be as high as thirty.
These higher limits are acceptable to researchers because of the low impact on their 
research. More importantly, researchers know they can request that a table with small 
numbers be released if they can show that there is no significant confidentiality risk. Hence, 
researchers know that when exceptions matter, they can have a sensible conversation with 
the output checker and negotiate a solution. This makes researchers happier, and evidence 
shows that contented researchers will also work actively to maintain data security.
The data providers are also happier. A higher limit means that they can be confident that 
there is a wide margin of error around regular outputs. At the same time, researchers 
requesting ‘special cases’ mean that the output checking is directed towards potentially 
more risky cases. Overall, security is improved, as limited resources are directed efficiently. 
A good analogy is with a zoo: you could spend the same amount of effort on cages for 
rabbits and tigers, but if public safety is your concern, it might be sensible to concentrate 
on getting that tiger enclosure right. (In statistical terms, the ‘tigers’ are tables, while the 
‘rabbits’ are regression models.).
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Finally, both researchers and output checkers benefit from a much faster approval time. 
Most researchers soon learn how to make sure their analyses are quickly approved and 
released; and with a high threshold, most outputs can be approved very quickly because the 
output checker knows that there is a wide margin for error. This avoids using expensive staff 
on unproductive activities.
 
2.2.2. How much risk is there in research outputs?
Unusual values, or ‘outliers’, may cause confidentiality problems (‘is there a billionaire living 
in your village?’), and researchers produce a much wider range of outputs than the original 
data providers. For example, researchers often use graphs to give readers a feel for the data.
Output checkers are there to identify such things, and researchers accept that there will be 
some limitations on their output; after all, this is confidential data being manipulated. Such 
limitations are reduced by the PBOSDC approach: both researchers and output checkers 
are trained to look for ways to make difficult data acceptable for publication.
In general, however, statistical outputs produced by researchers are much lower risk than 
those produced by the data providers. This is for three reasons:
 u Researchers choose their own samples 
 
Researchers often select subsamples of the data in ways which are not obvious to 
the reader; for example selecting on non-visible variables or characteristics, or by 
limiting the analysis to high-quality responses. This makes it harder to be certain who 
is in the data being used by researchers, even if the criteria for the subsample are 
published, as it requires a detailed knowledge of the data. 
 u Researchers transform the data 
 
Researchers spend a lot of time converting the data into different forms: taking 
logarithms, creating categories, combining multiple variables, generating growth 
rates, and so on. These reduce the likelihood of the original data being uncovered. 
 u Researchers carry out a wide range of analyses 
 
Researchers need access to this sensitive microdata because they are mostly 
interested in complicated statistical relationships. These tend to have very little 
disclosure risk because of the complexity of the mathematics behind the statistics, 
irrespective of the data. For example, many economists will use regression models; 
life scientists will be interested in odds ratios and survival functions. These have no 
effective disclosure risk as they are, in effect, summaries of processes within whole 
populations; they are not about individuals. In general the most valuable outputs 
produced by analysts fall into the category of ‘negligible risk’.
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When researchers do produce higher-risk outputs (for example, descriptive tables of the 
variables) these can be easily checked to see if the data or output has been transformed, 
or if the subsample is in some way guessable.
In short, research output tends to be much lower risk than the data providers would 
produce, simply because that need for complexity is what has driven the researchers to get 
access to this data in the first place.
2.3. Making PBOSDC work in the ADRN
2.3.1. Working with researchers
Mistakes can happen, and it is in everyone’s interests to make sure that the risk of this 
is kept low. This potentially conflicts with both parties’ aims of getting good research 
published so that the public benefit of that research can be realised. So, it is important 
that output checking is seen by both parties as a positive part of the research process, 
and the relationship between output checkers and researchers is crucial to PBOSDC 
working effectively. 
Both parties need to understand and agree on what sorts of output are likely to be released. 
If a researcher continually produces unacceptable outputs which will then be rejected, 
both parties will be annoyed and frustrated. Equally, if a researcher is worried about 
rejection and so avoids producing output that might be queried, potentially useful 
research may be stifled. 
For the system to work well, output checkers and researchers must have respect for the 
other’s abilities. If a researcher uses a technique which the checker has not encountered 
before, the former should help the latter understand the technique so that disclosure risk 
can be assessed; without that understanding the output cannot be cleared. 
A researcher keen for the release of vital results which fail the ‘rule of thumb’ may try 
to persuade the output checker to make an exception. The output checker must take 
the assessment of research value seriously. Equally, the researcher should be aware that 
the output checker will be responsible if it transpires that the output should not have 
been released. This collaborative approach is an important part of the training of both 
researchers and output checkers.
Output checkers and researchers need to be comfortable having conversations with each 
other about what is acceptable for release. If both understand and respect the other’s 
constraints, the discussion can be useful and the system can work to everyone’s advantage. 
Output checking is necessarily subjective, and the effectiveness of PBOSDC depends on 
how individuals approach output checking.
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2.3.2. Researcher training
As mentioned above, all ADRN researchers go through a face-to-face training programme, 
organised as part of the application process, to help them produce outputs which are 
publishable with few or no restrictions. The training has been continuously developed since 
2003, and is recognised around the world as best practice. The training is organised jointly 
with other organisations who manage access to confidential data for research, including 
the Office for National Statistics, HM Revenue and Customs, the UK Data Service, and the 
devolved administrations. 
This researcher training comes in three forms:
 u face-to-face training for researchers using the ADRCs, making them ‘ADRN trained 
researchers’
 u online training for researchers working on ADRN projects but who do not use the 
ADRCs (for example, co-authors, or PhD supervisors)
 u online refresher course for ‘ADRN researchers’ to maintain their training.
These are not available to non-researchers. However, readers can get a feel for the training 
content: the Eurostat self-study guide2 provides an online introduction covering many of 
the same themes as the ADRN training.
Given the importance of the relationship between the researcher and the output checker, 
a considerable part of the training is spent on exploring the wider concepts of data access. 
The training can’t cover all possible situations that might arise, but it should help individuals 
understand how to approach a new or difficult situation.
ADRN researchers also have online follow-up training, the plan being that it should be 
completed on a biennial basis to maintain their ‘ADRN researcher’ status.
2.3.3. Ensuring consistency and flexibility 
  across the ADRN
ADRN output checkers also go through the same training as researchers. These 
staff will need to see the clearance issue through the eyes of researchers, just as 
researchers need to see disclosure control through the eyes of the data providers. 
Not all researchers fully engage with the security model, so ADRN staff get additional 
training in difficult conversations.
The ADRN is a network, so groups of output checkers can meet to compare notes and 
revise training and guidance. The ADRN has also set up an expert group of SDC specialists 
to provide general oversight of strategy and processes, and to advise on specific problems. 
2 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/overview/self-study-material-for-microdata-users
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2.3.4. Rules-based output SDC in ADRC Northern Ireland
ADRC Northern Ireland does not use PBOSDC, but instead the simpler rules-based model 
(RBOSDC). In this model, the ‘guidelines’ on thresholds, dominance and so on are treated 
as hard rules: release is automatic depending on whether an output meets the rules or 
not, and researchers cannot challenge decisions. So, there is less need to train staff or 
researchers in SDC, and procedures can be automated.
This approach is well-suited to statistical organisations producing tabular outputs because 
it provides a consistent approach across many similar outputs and production units. For 
example, Eurostat’s current SDC training formally recommends RBOSDC. This was also 
the dominant model for research centres until the last decade, and is still used in some 
countries, although it is generally being phased out in favour of some form of PBOSDC.
Note that the same general SDC principles apply to PBOSDC and RBOSDC. The difference 
is in the implementation, in particular the role of context-sensitive flexibility and researcher 
feedback. Hence our staff in Northern Ireland go through the same SDC training as other 
ADRN staff.
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3. Resources
3.1. Websites
General information on the ADRN can be found at adrn.ac.uk, including other guides in this 
series and educational material.
The UK Data Service (www.ukdataservice.ac.uk) has an extensive range of documentation 
about data access, management and security.
The Five Safes website www.fivesafes.org contains guidance and further information on all 
aspects of confidential data management, including practical advice for output checkers 
and useful metaphors for non-specialists. In September 2015 the UK Data Service organised 
a workshop on the confidential data management using the Five Safes framework. 
All the presentations are available on the UKDS website at  
www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/news-and-events/eventsitem/?id=4058. 
Statistical agencies are a source of extensive expertise in data access, management and 
confidentiality. In the UK, the Office for National Statistics’ methodology advice page is 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/methodology/methodologytopicsandstatisticalconcepts/
disclosurecontrol. This is where developments in guidance can be found. 
Wider information from the Government Statistical Service is available at  
https://gss.civilservice.gov.uk/statistics/methodology-2/statistical-disclosure-control/.
 
Eurostat guidelines on microdata access at the European level are at http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/web/microdata, and a self-study guide is at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/
microdata/overview/self-study-material-for-microdata-users.
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4. Summary
Experience in many countries has shown that researcher analysis is one of the safest uses 
of confidential data, and public benefit can be generated by allowing access to such data. 
The ADRN is designed to make sure the security of the data is managed according to best 
practice throughout the data lifecycle.
This guidance document has looked at the final part of that chain: can we make sure 
researchers analysing data for the public good do not accidentally disclose any confidential 
information in their statistical findings? The answer is a resounding yes.
The ADRN builds on the experience of similar facilities in the UK and around the world. 
It has adopted principles-based output statistical disclosure control (PBOSDC), which 
was designed specifically for research environments like those of the ADRN. If disclosure 
control is to be applied to any output, the researcher will play an active role in deciding, for 
example, whether to redesign the table to protect sensitive cells or to apply suppression 
or another disclosure control technique. There should be no surprises in either outputs 
presented by the researcher or decisions reached by the output checker if there is an 
ongoing dialogue between the two throughout the process.
A key element of PBOSDC is the researcher’s engagement in both the ethos and practices 
of the ADRN. This is necessary for PBOSDC to work well, but more widely it encourages 
all parties to learn about and work with each other. This collaborative approach between 
the researcher, the output checker and the data provider promotes the smooth and secure 
operation of the ADRN. 
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5. Further Reading
5.1. Non-statistical papers for 
  a general audience
The key paper on designing OSDC for research is Statistical disclosure control in a research 
environment (Ritchie, 2007. mimeo, Office for National Statistics ). 
Principles- versus rules-based OSDC in remote access environments (Ritchie and Elliott, 
2015) discusses the rationale for the ADRN’s approach to OSDC.
The importance of developing positive relationships between researchers, output checkers 
and data providers can be found in Effective researcher management (Desai and Ritchie, 
2010) and Addressing the human factor (Ritchie and Welpton, 2014).
An overview of the confidentiality protection strategy used by the ADRN can be found in 
Five Safes: designing data access for research (Desai et al, 2016).
Readers interested in how SDC sits within the a wider framework of anonymisation 
and particularly its relationship with data protection legislation should consult the 
Anonymisation Decision Making Framework by Elliot et al (2016).
5.2. Statistical papers
A detailed review of SDC, plus some comments on OSDC, can be found in Statistical 
Disclosure Control (Hundepool et al, 2012). For a wider review of the statistical 
confidentiality field see Duncan et al (2011). For an up to date review of the SDC field see 
the biannual Privacy in Statistical databases publication by Domingo-Ferrer and colleagues 
and published by Springer. 
Guidance for output checkers can be found in Brandt et al (2010). Specific rules for linear 
regression analysis, along with a review of the role of subjectivity in disclosure control, are 
covered in Operationalising safe statistics: the case of linear regression (Ritchie, 2014). 
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7. Glossary
The following definitions are used in the document. 
Confidential: information which is not expected or allowed to be put in the public domain
Data provider: the organisation which collected the data and makes it available for research 
use through the ADRCs 
De-identified: Microdata with direct identifiers such as name and address removed
Disclosure: the release of confidential information to unauthorised parties
Five Safes: A framework for identifying sources of risk in when accessing data (the Five Safes 
are Projects, People, Settings, Data, Outputs)
Frequency table: A table of counts of the number of individuals in different categories; for 
example, GP registrations tabulated by local authority
Identification: The association of a cell in a table or a microdata record with a member of 
the population
Magnitude table: A table containing totals or averages of a particular response across all 
individuals in the table cells; for example, average income tabulated by family size
Microdata: Record level data, each row represents responses relating to that particular 
individual, household or business
OSDC (Output Statistical Disclosure Control): The protection of outputs which are to be 
circulated outside a research environment
Output checker: individual at one of the ADRCs who reviews outputs before release from 
the secure environment
PBOSDC (Principles Based Output Statistical Disclosure Control): OSDC where the emphasis 
is on researchers and output checkers working together to ensure that outputs are checked 
quickly and efficiently
Statistical Disclosure Control: The prevention of the release (and the perception of 
release) of information which may lead to the identification of a statistical unit or 
attribute associated with that unit
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8. Appendix 1: A ‘belt and braces’ 
 approach to confidentiality
Output checking is only one of the ways that the ADRN maintains confidentiality. The ADRN 
uses the ‘Five Safes’ framework to evaluate risks when handling confidential data. 
The Five Safes are:
 u safe projects: ensuring that the use of the data is lawful, ethical and creates a  
public benefit
 u safe people: ensuring that users of the data know their responsibilities and 
obligations and have the tools to use data appropriately
 u safe settings: making the data available in was which maintain confidentiality but do 
not unnecessarily restrict researchers’ freedom
 u safe data: removing unnecessary identifying information from data files before 
making them available to researchers
 u safe outputs: checking outputs using PBOSDC
Hence, output checking should be seen as the last link in the chain of protection, there to 
guard against accidents despite all the other checks in place. 
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